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Perhaps the hottest debate in banking today is the one 
about letting bank holding companies (BHCs) engage 
in certain financial lines of business outside of commer-
cial banking.
1 Large BHCs have vigorously argued for 
lowering barriers to entry into investment banking, full-
service securities brokerage, the insurance business, 
and real estate investment and development. These 
BHCs point out that nonbank financial firms such as 
securities firms and insurance companies have been 
permitted into traditional bank activities. They argue 
that lowering the entry barriers into nonbank activities 
would not only be equitable—by leveling the playing 
field—but would also bring some needed competition 
into nonbank activities.
2 
Critics of expanded BHC powers argue that if BHCs 
enter currently prohibited activities, the risk to bank 
subsidiaries will increase. They argue that many of the 
sought-after nonbank financial activities are riskier 
than commercial banking. Therefore, if BHCs are 
permitted to expand into those activities, they say, the 
incidence of commercial bank failure—or its common 
analogue, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) rescue—will quite likely increase. 
Proponents of expanded powers for BHCs, of course, 
have very different opinions about the impact of 
expansion on BHC risk. They offer two principal views 
of what would happen if BHCs became involved in 
nonbank financial activities. One is that risk, as mea-
sured by the variability of BHC profits, would decrease 
because of the effect of asset diversification. The other 
view is that such risk might increase, but that increase 
would be more than compensated for by an increase in 
* Also Adjunct Professor of Finance, University of Minnesota. 
•The authority to permit BHCs to engage in nonbank activities resides in 
the Federal Reserve System. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and its 
subsequent amendments authorize the Fed to determine what nonbank 
activities, other than those specifically prohibited by law, are permissible for a 
BHC (defined as a holding company controlling one or more banks). The basic 
criteria are that a permissible activity must be closely related to banking and 
that it must provide net public benefits. A BHCs entry into permissible 
activities requires prior approval by the Fed. 
The nonbank activities that BHCs are specifically denied by law include 
(most prominently lately) the insurance and securities businesses. The Bank 
Holding Company Act and the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 
1982 prohibit BHCs from engaging in most insurance activities. And the 
Glass-Steagall sections of the Banking Act of 1933 separate commercial 
banking from investment banking. 
These prohibitions are being reconsidered today. In early 1987, for 
example, the Fed approved several BHC applications to underwrite a limited 
volume of third-party commercial paper, mortgage-backed securities, con-
sumer receivable-related securities, and municipal revenue bonds. In August 
1987, in response to the Fed's actions and other actions which tested the federal 
prohibitions, the U.S. Congress passed the Competitive Equality Banking Act 
of 1987 which imposed a moratorium on bank and BHC expansion into 
securities activities. Although that moratorium has expired, the specific actions 
taken by the Fed have been stayed by a court and are now under appeal before 
the U.S. Supreme Court. At the end of March 1988, with strong backing from 
the administration and bank regulatory agencies, the Senate passed a bill that 
would permit BHCs to enter some currently prohibited securities activities. By 
early June 1988, though, the House had not yet acted on this issue. 
2Until recently, nonbank firms were able to exploit a loophole in the Bank 
Holding Company Act which let them own a firm that acted like a bank as long 
as it did not offer both demand deposit and commercial loan services. If a firm 
did not offer one of those services, it was not considered a bank under the Bank 
Holding Company Act. Firms that exhibited these characteristics were 
commonly referred to as nonbank banks. This loophole was closed by the 
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, which redefined a bank to include 
any financial firm whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC). Nonbank banks established before March 1987 were 
exempted from this law. 
3 average profitability. As a result, the incidence of bank 
failure would decrease.
3 
Resolution of the debate about these two views is 
essentially an empirical matter. Surprisingly, though, 
few formal studies have provided empirical evidence on 
the likely risk/return consequences of permitting BHC 
expansion into the other lines of business. 
A major objective of this study is to partially fill that 
void. The question we address is, Will the risk of 
bankruptcy decrease or increase if BHCs are permitted 
to engage in the securities, insurance, and real estate 
businesses? We use a measure of the risk of failure 
(bankruptcy risk) that takes into account average rates 
of return, the variability of rates of return, and the level 
of capitalization. This lets us make explicit, and 
empirically test, the second view, that mergers between 
BHCs and nonbank financial firms would reduce the 
risk of failure because increased average rates of return 
would offset increased variability of rates of return. And 
since the first view is a subset of the second, our analysis 
effectively addresses both views. 
Our study has two parts. First we analyze the 
risk/return characteristics of the various existing indus-
tries. Using data for 249 publicly traded bank and 
nonbank financial firms during 1971-84, we compute 
sample risk and rate of return statistics for each 
industry. This analysis provides an objective look at the 
historical relative risk and profitability in these indus-
tries. It also provides a basis for comparison with the 
second, hypothetical part of our study. There we 
analyze the effects of BHC expansion into currently 
prohibited activities by simulating mergers between 
actual BHCs and nonbank firms as if such mergers had 
been permitted. This approach lets us generate sample 
risk and return statistics for hypothetical industries like 
the BHC-life insurance industry. To see the effects of 
the mergers, these statistics are compared to risk and 
return statistics for the unmerged BHC industry. All 
tests are done with accounting (book) data and with 
market (stock price) data. Accounting data results 
appear in the paper; market data results, in Appendix A. 
Regardless of which data are used, the results of the 
existing industry analysis are unambiguous. In the 
sample period, the securities industry has been more 
profitable than most of the other financial industries, 
including banking. However, BHCs have not been 
consistently less profitable than other financial firms. In 
terms of profitability, BHCs rank about in the middle-
behind some industries, but ahead of others. In terms of 
risk, BHCs rank even better. The industry data indicate 
that, among financial firms, securities and real estate 
firms are the riskiest and BHCs and insurance firms are 
the least risky. 
The results of the hypothetical merger industry 
analysis, based on both types of data, are also clear. The 
merger simulations suggest that when BHCs combine 
with securities firms or real estate developers, the 
volatility of returns increases and so does the risk of 
failure. For these combinations of firms, therefore, 
neither the first nor the second view of expansion 
proponents is supported. For combinations of BHCs 
and life insurance companies, though, both views are 
supported: these combinations seem to reduce both the 
volatility of returns and the risk of failure, suggesting 
the potential for risk-reducing diversification. The 
answer to our central question about what will happen 
to risk if BHCs can enter other financial industries thus 
appears to be, It depends on which industries they enter. 
Methodology 
Measures of Profitability and Risk 
In this study, we use one measure of profitability and 
two measures of risk. The profitability measure is the 
rate of return on average accounting equity, R: 
3A third view is that whether or not risk would increase doesn't really 
matter because bank subsidiaries can be legally protected against adverse 
results that originate in nonbank subsidiaries. As we have argued in Boyd and 
Graham 1986, this third view about risk is fundamentally flawed. The essence 
of the view is that legal walls can be built around the commercial bank 
subsidiary to insulate it from any risky activity conducted by a nonbank 
subsidiary. But relying on legal walls, or corporate separateness, is not likely to 
be an effective way to shelter bank subsidiaries of BHCs from risk. Theoreti-
cally, as long as corporations have a common parent, they will also have a 
commonality of interests—imposed from the top if not from within. Inevitably, 
this commonality will produce incentives for cross-subsidization among firms. 
Indeed, it can be shown that, under quite general conditions, policies that 
maximize the profits of each subsidiary individually do not maximize total 
consolidated profits and vice versa. Thus, if total consolidated profits are 
actually maximized, this must be at the expense of profits of one or more of the 
individual affiliates. 
Incentives for intercorporate cross-subsidization can be very strong, 
particularly if an affiliate is in financial distress. Resources can be moved 
among corporations that have a common management in a myriad of ways, 
some of which are undoubtedly still waiting to be discovered. The history of Fed 
supervision in this area suggests that when management is determined and 
creative, thwarting such interaffiliate transfers is extremely difficult. 
We recognize that it is possible to impose such an extreme degree of 
corporate separateness that problems in one affiliate simply could not spread to 
another. For example, regulation might prohibit all interaffiliate transactions, 
cross-selling, and sharing of management. However, such restrictions would 
also preclude any advantages in combining banking with nonbank lines of 
business. Besides, investors can already create such combinations themselves, 
by buying shares in a bank, a life insurance company, a brokerage, and so on. It 
seems fair to say that no one views total corporate separateness as a desirable 
approach. What is sought, instead, is a system that lets BHC affiliates operate 
much like a single consolidated firm, except that nonbank affiliate losses cannot 
be transmitted to bank affiliates. We doubt that creating such a system is 
possible. For more on this topic, see Chase 1971; Chase and Mingo 1975; 
Talley 1975; Lawrence and Talley 1976; Jessee and Seelig 1977; Rose 1978; 
Savage 1978; and Eisenbeis 1983a, b. 
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(1) Rj = 2irj/(Ej + Ej_l) 
where n is net income after taxes, E is total equity, and 
the subscript j denotes the time period. [Here and 
throughout a tilde (~) denotes a random variable.] 
The first risk measure, 5, is a measure of the 
volatility of the rate of return on equity or, more 
precisely, the standard deviation of R. The empirically 
estimated standard deviation of R is defined as 




where n is the number of sample periods and R is the 
sample mean of the R-. One reason we use the measure 
S is that it is popular in the banking and finance lit-
erature. Another reason is that this risk measure tests 
the first view of BHC expansion proponents—that BHC 
expansion into new financial business lines would 
reduce the volatility of rates of return because of asset 
diversification. 
The second risk measure, Z (or Z-score), is an 
indicator of the probability of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy 
is defined as the situation where losses (negative 
profits) exceed equity, or fr<-E. If A = total assets, 
f — TT/A, and/c= —ElA, then the probability of bank-
ruptcy can be written as 
(3) p(jr<-E) = p(r <k)= f^ <Kr) dr 
where /?(•) is a probability and </>(r) is the probability 
density function of r. If r is normally distributed, as we 
assume, then (3) may be rewritten as 
(4) p(r<k)=f^N( 0, 1 )dz 
(5) z — (k p)/o 
where p is the true mean of the r distribution, o is the 
true standard deviation, and z is the number of standard 
deviations below the mean by which profits would have 
to fall in order to eliminate equity.
4 In this sense, z is an 
indicator of the probability of bankruptcy. Here we 
substitute sample estimates for p and o in (5) and give 
the estimated value of —z (since z is a negative number) 
the label Z: 
(6) Z = ({Z"j=l[2irJ/(Aj + Aj_l)]}/n 
+ {2"m[(Ej + Ej_t )/(Aj + Aj_{ )]}/n)/Sr 
where Sr is the estimated standard deviation of r. 
Note that high values of Z are associated with low 
probabilities of failure. The Z-score increases with the 
ratio of equity to assets, —k, and with the mean rate of 
return on assets, p; it decreases with the volatility of 
asset returns, a. One reason we use the risk measure Z is 
that, from a public policy perspective, the risk of failure 
of bank subsidiaries is the primary concern regarding 
BHC product line expansion. Another reason we use Z 
is that it directly tests the second view of proponents of 
BHC expansion—that increases in volatility of rates of 
return, as represented by a, would be offset by increases 
in rates of return, p, resulting in a lowered risk of 
failure.
5 
Aggregating From Firms to Industries 
We report industry sample statistics for the profitability 
measure and the two risk measures. To do this, first 
we compute R, S, and Z for each firm. Then we com-
pute the medians of the firm statistics for each industry.
6 
We don't compute risk measures for an industry based 
on its aggregate profits, assets, and equity. That method 
would lower estimates of the industry risk measures by 
some unknown amount. We are interested in the 
riskiness of the average firm in the industry, not the 
riskiness of the industry average. 
Comparing median industry values of the risk 
measures S and Z is not a conceptually valid way of 
investigating the risk effects of BHC diversification into 
the nonbank industries; this is why we also conduct 
merger experiments. Even so, the industry-based risk 
measures are of considerable interest and value in 
themselves. Unlike simulation results, they require no 
complicated computer manipulations of the underlying 
data and no simplifying assumptions. The industry 
measures may therefore be viewed as representing the 
distributions underlying the more elaborate simulation 
4Even if r is not normally distributed, z is still a useful risk measure as long 
as p and o exist. We can invoke the Bienayme-Tchebycheff inequality and 
p(r<k)< {o/(p—k)}
2. Then z is the upper-bound, or worst-case, probability of 
bankruptcy. See Roy 1952. 
5Note that in computing Z we treat a BHC as a single consolidated 
organization which survives or fails as an entity. The Z-score indicates the 
probability that consolidated total losses will exceed consolidated total equity. 
In using this approach, we dismiss corporate separateness and thus ignore the 
possibility that one or more BHC subsidiaries could survive the failure of 
another subsidiary. This is admittedly a simplification, one that lets us use a 
single value of Z to indicate the probability of bankruptcy. However, it is 
consistent with our view that corporate separateness is at best a poor device to 
protect banking affiliates of BHCs. See note 3. 
6We summarize all results using median statistics instead of the more 
common mean statistics because the median is not heavily influenced by one or 
a few outlying observations as the mean is. Still, in only a few instances are the 
two statistics much different in our sample results. 
5 results. Fortunately, both sets of tests lead to much the 
same conclusions. 
Simulating Mergers 
The risk effects of combining a BHC with a firm from 
one of the other industries depend not only on the 
standard deviation of returns in each industry, but also 
on the covariance between returns. 
Assume, for example, that a BHC acquires a life 
insurance firm. Post-merger consolidated assets can be 
represented by x percent bank assets and \~x percent 
insurance assets. The rate of return on post-merger 
consolidated assets (or equity) will be a simple 
weighted average of the rates of return on bank assets 
(equity) and on insurance assets (equity). However, the 
variance (or squared standard deviation) of post-
merger rates of return will be a more complicated 
nonlinear expression. Consider the variance of the 
rate of return on post-merger consolidated assets, o 
If ol~ the variance of the rate of return on BHC assets, 
o] = the variance of the rate of return on insurance 
assets, and oh • = the covariance between these two 
rates of return, then 
(7) 02 = x2o2 + ( 1 — x)2o2i + 2x(l ~x)obi. 
Clearly, knowledge of the two variances is insufficient 
to determine the variance of consolidated returns, o
2. 
One way to estimate is to separately estimate 
each component in (7), that is, the two variances, the 
covariance, and the proportions of bank and nonbank 
assets. As we have learned, however, this may not be a 
valid procedure. (See Boyd, Hanweck, and Pithyachari-
yakul 1980 and Boyd and Graham 1986.) The under-
lying distributions of industry returns often do not 
exhibit desirable statistical properties. For example, 
they are often not joint-normal or time-stationary, and 
they may exhibit significant firm effects within an 
industry. (Those firm effects simply reflect the impreci-
sion of industry definitions, but they still complicate the 
process of estimation.) 
To avoid these problems, we use a very different 
method of estimating the riskiness (and profitability) of 
BHC-other financial firm combinations. Instead of 
estimating each component of (7) from the industry 
data, we use historical data on individual firms to 
simulate hypothetical mergers between actual BHCs 
and actual firms from the other industries. The merger 
partners—for each merger, one BHC and one nonbank 
firm—are chosen randomly, with replacement. For 
each hypothetical firm created by a simulated merger, 
assets, equity, and profits are consolidated. From these 
data, a time series of returns is generated and estimates 
of R, S, and Z are made for each hypothetical firm. For 
each type of nonbank financial firm that BHCs are 
merged with, 100 hypothetical firms—each with its 
own R, S, and Z—are produced, so that six new, 
hypothetical industries are created. From these data, 
median estimates of R, S, and Z for the hypothetical 
industries are obtained. 
This hypothetical merger method is based on simple 
assumptions. In effect, we assume that the merged firm 
is simply the sum of the two individual firms. We merge 
the firms based on their accounting (book) values. 
Consolidated total assets, equity, and profits for the 
hypothetical firm are obtained by summing the assets, 
equity, and profits of the merging firms. We thus ignore 
synergies that might result from the combination, as 
well as out-of-pocket merger costs, merger premiums, 
and changes in capitalization associated with the 
combination. Obviously, these assumptions are not 
realistic. Some of the assumptions will bias results in 
favor of expansion; others will have the opposite effect. 
However, this simplicity is defensible: It avoids the 
subjectivity inherent in the determination of hypothet-
ical merger terms on a case-by-case basis and thus lets 
us computer-simulate a large number of mergers. 
The Sample 
All of our data cover the years 1971-84 and come from 
Standard and Poor's COMPUSTAT tapes. This source 
provides both types of data we need—accounting and 
market data—for publicly traded firms, which tend to 
be the larger firms in their industries. Included in the 
sample are 146 BHCs, 11 securities firms,
7 30 life 
insurance companies, 15 property/casualty insurance 
firms, 5 insurance agent/broker firms, 31 real estate 
development companies, and 11 other real estate firms. 
(Industry classifications are determined by Standard 
and Poor's.) Not all sample firms have data in all 
sample periods, but we required that each sample firm 
have at least five years of data. The size distribution of 
the sample firms is in Table 1, and a list of the firms is in 
Appendix C. 
Obviously, BHCs are much more heavily repre-
sented in the sample than are firms from the other 
financial industries. This was not our decision, but 
rather simply reflects the data available on COMPU-
7In this study, we use the term securities to represent all the activities 
engaged in by firms in this industry, including investment banking and 
brokerage. 
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Table 1 
The Sample 
Number and Size of Sample Financial Firms, 1971-84 
Assets ($ million) 
Industry 
Number 
of Firms  Median  Smallest  Largest  Mean 
Property/Casualty Insurance  15  2,590  62  16,501  3,546 
Bank Holding Company  146  2,567  307  86,267  6,455 
Life Insurance  30  1,004  13  28,196  3,051 
Insurance Agent/Broker  5  553  108  584  407 
Securities  11  472  84  12,159  3,677 
Other Real Estate  11  129  16  831  252 
Real Estate Development  31  112  6  772  137 
Source: Standard and Poor's Compustat Services, Inc. 
STAT. However, our merger simulations are not based 
on the proportion of any type of firm in the sample. 
Therefore, the relatively large number of BHCs should 
not bias the results. Still, for some industries (especially 
for the insurance agents/brokers) the small sample size 




According to our sample, BHCs are neither the most 
nor the least profitable financial firms. Table 2 shows 
that the highest median rates of return on equity in 
1971-84 belong to insurance agents/brokers, which 
have a return of 20 percent, and securities firms, which 
have a return of 16.5 percent. BHC rates of return, at 
13.1 percent, are roughly comparable to those of life 
insurance and property/casualty insurance firms. The 
lowest returns belong to real estate development and 
other real estate firms, which have returns of 10 percent 
and 0.7 percent, respectively. 
• Risk 
According to both measures of risk, BHCs are the least 
risky financial firms. As is clear in Table 3, their risk 
measures, both S and Z, are fairly close to those of life 
insurance firms. (Recall that the Z-score and risk are 
inversely related.) Also clear is that, by both measures, 
the riskiest financial firms are the securities and real 
estate firms.
8 
Hypothetically Merged Industries 
• Profitability 
Results of the merger simulations are shown in Tables 
4 and 5. For purposes of comparison, statistics for the 
unmerged BHC industry are also shown there. Recall 
that median returns on equity for firms created by the 
simulated mergers are linear combinations of the 
median rates of return among the underlying industries. 
According to Table 4, BHCs could generally have 
increased this measure of profitability by going into the 
8The Z-scores computed with accounting data are so large that, if the 
distributions of returns are normal, then the Z-scores imply infinitesimal 
probabilities of failure. For several reasons, however, we think these risk 
measures underestimate the true probabilities of bankruptcy. First, visual 
inspection of the return distributions suggests that they may not be normally 
distributed. Second, our definition of bankruptcy is too restrictive. According to 
it, a BHC is not bankrupt unless it experiences a one-period loss that exceeds its 
consolidated equity. Actually, large BHCs would experience depositor runs, 
liquidity problems, and massive regulatory intervention in much less dire 
circumstances; whether or not they were technically bankrupt would be a moot 
issue. Moreover, with our definition, failure cannot occur a little bit at a time, 
spread over several years. Third, and finally, smoothing of the accounting 
earnings is very likely occurring, with the result that the estimated earnings 
volatility is downward biased. That may be seen by comparing the accounting 
risk measures presented in the paper with the market risk measures presented in 
Appendix A. The market data produce returns that are much more volatile and 
Z-scores that are much lower and arguably more plausible. Note, though, that 
with regard to the relative profitability and risk in these industries the two sets of 
measures generally agree. For more on the use of Z-scores, see Wall 1986. 
7 Tables 2-5 
Measuring Profitability and Risk in Banking and Other Financial Industries 
Tables 2 and 3 
Historically, 1971-84 
Table 2 Profitability Table 3 Risk 
Median 
Industry  Median /?*  Industry  S**  zt 
Insurance Agent/Broker  19.98%  Bank Holding Company  .0245  43.36 
Securities  16.52  Life Insurance  .0261  36.79 
Property/Casualty Insurance  13.44  Property/Casualty Insurance  .0467  24.56 
Bank Holding Company  13.12  Insurance Agent/Broker  .0554  15.97 
Life Insurance  12.82  Securities  .0909  13.33 
Real Estate Development  10.03  Other Real Estate  .0925  12.98 
Other Real Estate  .65  Real Estate Development  .1382  8.66 
Tables 4 and 5 
If a Bank Holding Company Could Have Merged With One Nonbank Financial Firm 
Table 4 Profitability Table 5 Risk 
Median 
Industry §  Median R*  lndustry§  s**  zt 
BHC-lnsurance Agent/Broker  15.59%  BHC—Life Insurance  .0201  49.30 
BHC-Securities  14.06  BHCs Alone  .0245  43.36 
BHCs Alone  13.12  BHC-Other Real Estate  .0256  37.86 
BHC-Property/Casualty Insurance  12.97  BHC-lnsurance Agent/Broker  .0302  33.28 
BHC—Life Insurance  12.95  BHC—Real Estate Development  .0419  28.82 
BHC-Other Real Estate  12.46  BHC-Property/Casualty Insurance  .0432  25.28 
BHC—Real Estate Development  10.08  BHC-Securities  .0480  24.93 
*Rate of return on equity 
"Standard deviation of return on equity 
tMeasure of bankruptcy risk 
§Each hypothetical industry includes 100 firms created by merging 2 randomly selected firms from our 1971-84 sample of publicly traded financial firms. 
Source: Standard and Poor's Compustat Services, Inc. 
insurance agent/broker and securities industries. Going 
into real estate development, though, would likely have 
reduced BHC profitability. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the profitability 
data in Table 4, however, is that the effects of mergers 
on rates of return are relatively small. This can be 
explained by two factors. Either rates of return for 
BHCs are not much different than rates of return in the 
other industries, or BHCs' share of consolidated assets 
after merger is large. (See Table 6.) These numbers 
clearly reflect the size of sample BHCs compared to 
that of most sample firms in the other industries. 
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Table 6 
Bank Holding Companies' Share of Assets 
in Simulated Mergers 
Median 
Hypothetical Industry*  BHC Share 
BHC-Other Real Estate  97% 
BHC-Real Estate Development  94 
BHC-lnsurance Agent/Broker  91 
BHC-Securities  79 
BHC—Life Insurance  71 
BHC-Property/Casualty Insurance  62 
*Each hypothetical industry includes 100 firms created by merging 2 randomly selected firms 
from our 1971-84 sample of publicly traded financial firms. 
Source: Standard and Poor's Compustat Services, Inc. 
• Risk 
The sheer size of banking will tend to limit profit 
opportunities for BHC expansion into other financial 
industries. However, the risk effects of hypothetical 
mergers may be substantial even though the nonbank 
merger partner is relatively small. Table 5 shows 
estimates of the risk measures, S and Z. For purposes of 
comparison, these risk measures are also shown for the 
unmerged BHC industry. 
The results for the two measures are the same. Risk 
increases substantially (that is, is much higher com-
pared to the unmerged BHC industry) in mergers with 
securities firms, property/casualty insurance firms, and 
real estate development firms. Risk increases mini-
mally in mergers with other real estate and insurance 
agent/broker firms. Only in mergers with life insurance 
firms does risk decline, and there it doesn't decline 
much. 
Charts 1-6 are a different way of looking at the risk 
measure Z. Rather than just displaying the median 
Z-score, these charts also show the entire frequency 
distribution of Z-scores for the combinations of BHCs 
and firms in the other six industries. Each chart includes 
the Z-scores for 100 simulations of hypothetically 
merged firms. The objective is to be sure that the 
median is conveying meaningful information about the 
relative riskiness of the various combinations. 
The charts suggest that, in general, this is true. 
Consider, for example, the BHC-securities industry 
(Chart 1) versus the BHC-life insurance industry 
(Chart 3). Clearly, as their median Z-score would 
suggest, the BHC-life insurance combinations place 
much more mass on the right (low-risk) end of the scale 
than do the BHC-securities combinations. Further, the 
life insurance combinations have 13 Z-scores greater 
than 90 and off the right end of the scale whereas the 
securities combinations have only 1. Chart 6 does 
reveal one type of merger combination for which the 
median Z-score may be a misleading indicator: BHC-
other real estate. According to Table 5, the median 
Z-score for this combination is 37.86, making it the 
second least-risky combination (after BHC-life insur-
ance). Yet the Z-score distribution for this combination 
places a lot of mass on low Z-scores, at the left (high-
risk) end of the scale. Aside from this combination, 
though, the frequency distributions support the median 
results: BHC-life insurance combinations are relatively 
low risk whereas BHC-securities combinations are 
relatively high risk. 
• Summary 
In summary, then, we find that mergers between BHCs 
and securities firms are likely to increase profitability. 
However, they are not likely to result in the reduced risk 
of failure that advocates of such mergers have pre-
dicted. If anything, such mergers are likely to increase 
BHC risk. That conclusion about risk is also true for 
BHC mergers with real estate development and property/ 
casualty insurance firms. It is not true, though, for BHC 
mergers with life insurance firms: they may reduce the 
risk of BHC failure. These conclusions are based on 
both the median risk measures and the frequency 
distributions of Z-scores for the hypothetically merged 
industries.
9 
Possible Sources of Bias 
Our findings hinge on the nature of the experiments, the 
assumptions, and the sample data. Some of those 
factors may tend to bias our results for BHC expansion, 
thus supporting the views of its proponents; other 
factors may have the opposite effect. 
Bias For BHC Expansion 
• Random Mergers? 
The logic of picking merger partners randomly, as we 
did, might seem questionable to some. They might 
argue that smart BHC managers would not intention-
9For a limited analysis of the potential risk effects of BHCs merging with 
more than one type of nonbank financial firm, see Appendix B. 
9 Charts 1-6 
Another Look at the Risk of Bankruptcy If a Bank Holding Company 
Could Have Merged With One Nonbank Financial Firm 
Frequency Distributions of Z-Scores and Median Z-Scores of Hypothetical Industries* 
Chart 1 BHC-Securities 
Median  1 Outlier i-
Chart 2 BHC-Property/Casualty Insurance 
Median  5 Outliers 
Chart 3 BHC-Life Insurance 
Median  13 Outliers 
Chart 4 BHC-lnsurance Agent/Broker 
Median  5 Outliers 
Chart 5 BHC-Real Estate Development  Chart 6 BHC-Other Real Estate 
4 Outliers  15 Outliers 
*Each hypothetical industry includes 100 firms created by merging 2 randomly selected firms from our 1971-84 sample of publicly traded financial firms. 
The Z-score and risk are inversely related, 
tOutliers are merged firms with Z-scores greater than 90. 
Source: Standard and Poor's Compustat Services, Inc. 
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ally merge their firm with a low-profit or high-risk 
nonbank firm. Rather, rational BHC managers might 
be expected to pick out the better merger partners from 
each nonbank industry. Thus, our results, this argument 
would suggest, understate the profitability and over-
state the risk of BHC mergers with other financial firms. 
This argument seems plausible, to be sure, but it 
overlooks several important facts. One is that each 
industry has a limited number of firms for which data 
are available. When the high-profit/low-risk candi-
dates have been picked off, the firms that remain must 
have less desirable characteristics. Studying a limited 
number of the most desirable mergers would be 
misleading, especially since (with the advantage of 
hindsight) we can determine exactly what the best 
merger combinations would have been. 
Another relevant fact is that those nonbank firms 
with exceptional risk/return characteristics are likely to 
be attractive to all investors, not just to BHCs. This fact 
would generally be reflected in share prices as well as in 
merger premiums. That would reduce their expected 
profitability and, thus, their Z-score in a way our study 
does not take into account. 
Finally, it is not obvious that BHC managers want to 
diversify asset holdings in order to decrease risk. (We 
shall return to this point when we discuss moral hazard 
below.) 
• Unrepresentative Sample? 
Another objection to our study might be that the small 
sample of firms in some nonbank financial industries 
(for example, 5 insurance agent/broker firms and 11 
securities firms) is too small to be representative of 
those industries. In addition, these results do not 
necessarily hold for BHC acquisitions of small nonbank 
financial firms or for de novo expansion (creating 
rather than acquiring nonbank firms). 
We cannot deny that in some industries our sample 
size is small. But we did not intentionally limit sample 
size; that was determined by the number of firms listed 
on COMPUSTAT. We specifically chose this data source 
because it includes only firms whose stock is publicly 
traded. That was important because many of our 
empirical tests (discussed in Appendix A) require stock 
price data. Thus, a small sample size for an industry 
simply reflects the fact that that industry does not have 
many publicly traded firms. All we assert here is that 
our results are representative of publicly traded firms. 
Of course, results of a study like ours could be quite 
different for BHC acquisitions of small nonbank firms 
or for de novo expansion. Whether results would be 
better or worse, though, is an open question. Again, we 
do not claim that our results can be extrapolated to 
situations we did not study. 
• No Economies of Scale or Scope 
Admittedly, any potential for economies of scale or 
scope (synergies) is ignored in our simulations. These 
might seem significant omissions to some, since many 
think they are major reasons why BHCs want to expand 
into other financial industries. Presumably, such econ-
omies would result in higher profits and higher Z-scores 
than those we obtained. 
We seriously question the existence of economies of 
scale in banking and related financial businesses. Most 
studies indicate they have not been detected beyond a 
rather modest size, and some have even found disecon-
omies of scale. (See, for example, Berger, Han week, and 
Humphrey 1987.) 
We do recognize the potential gains stemming from 
synergies between different financial lines of business. 




Bias Against BHC Expansion 
• No Failed Sample Firms 
Our sample has a form of selection bias: It does not 
include any firms that failed during the sample period. 
Undoubtedly, some nonbanks did fail during this period 
since, unlike banks, nonbanks do not have a regulatory 
safety net. The sample does, however, include some 
BHCs (First Pennsylvania and Continental Illinois, for 
example) that might have failed without FDIC inter-
vention. This selection bias thus makes our results 
understate the risk of nonbanks compared to that of 
BHCs. 
• No Merger Premiums or Costs 
Our methodology also does not take account of merger 
premiums or out-of-pocket merger costs, both of which 
would tend to decrease the profitability and increase the 
risk (Z-scores) of merged firms. Merger premiums, 
especially, may be substantial, but they depend on the 
type of merger—exchanges of shares or cash buy-outs, 
for example—and thus are difficult to build into our 
simulations. 
10Other studies have found that some types of newly acquired nonbank 
subsidiaries are systematically less profitable than their unaffiliated peers. This 
could suggest that scope economies are unimportant or even that there are 
diseconomies. Alternatively, it could simply reflect a period of learning that 
firms often experience when they enter a new line of business. See Rhoades 
1975, 1980; Rhoades and Boczar 1977; and Talley 1976. 
11 • Conservative Capitalization 
We have taken the building-block approach to post-
merger capital structure: By assumption, the merged 
firm's capital is just the sum of the capital of the two 
merging firms. This is an extremely conservative 
assumption. As Table 7 (and Table A5 in Appendix A) 
shows, the capital-to-asset ratios of all the nonbank 
financial industries in our study are much higher than 
that required for BHCs. Therefore, in our simulations, 
the post-merger capital ratio must be higher than the 
ratio of the BHCs alone. Actually, though, BHC 
managers might well choose to reduce the post-merger 
capital ratio back to the regulatory minimum—unless, 
of course, the authorities prohibited them from doing 
so. That, however, would require that regulators adhere 
to the building-block standard and prohibit the double-
leveraging of nonbank acquisitions, neither of which 
has been strictly enforced before. Because of our 
conservative assumption regarding capitalization, our 
simulations likely understate BHC merger risk, as 
measured by both S and Z. 
• No Moral Hazard 
One more way our study may understate risk is by 
ignoring what is known as moral hazard. This problem 
arises because the structure of FDIC deposit insurance 
may induce bank managers to seek risky balance sheet 
configurations. (See, for example, Merton 1977; 
Kareken and Wallace 1978; Sharpe 1978; Dothan and 
Williams 1980; or Buser, Chen, and Kane 1981.) The 
problem is not that these managers necessarily like risk 
per se, but rather that the deposit insurance system 
distorts payoffs in such a way that risk-taking is more 
than fairly compensated. This distortion may extend to 
BHC nonbank affiliates, too, if the FDIC ends up 
insuring, de facto, some or all nonbank liabilities, as it 
has in some cases. The presence of moral hazard 
suggests that assuming that BHC managers want to 
diversify to reduce risk may not be correct. They may 
instead prefer to take advantage of expanded asset 
powers to increase risk. 
Conclusions 
The results of this analysis (using both accounting data 
and market data) challenge two major assertions made 
by proponents of expanded powers for BHCs. One is 
that BHC expansion into other financial industries 
would necessarily reduce the volatility of BHC profits. 
We found some evidence that this is true for the life 
insurance industry. But our results suggest it is not true 
for the securities or real estate development industries; 
Table 7 
Capitalization of Bank Holding Companies 




Industry  Ratio 
Bank Holding Company  5.80% 
Securities  20.05 
Life Insurance  20.55 
Property/Casualty Insurance  22.06 
Other Real Estate  24.41 
Real Estate Development  27.49 
Insurance Agent/Broker  37.28 
Source: Standard and Poor's Compustat Services, Inc. 
indeed, our results suggest that entering those lines of 
business would increase the volatility of BHC profits. 
The other assertion our results challenge is that any 
increased volatility that might result when currently 
prohibited activities became permissible would be fully 
offset by increased average profitability. We tested this 
view using a measure of bankruptcy risk that nets out 
the offsetting effects of increased mean and variance of 
returns. The results do not support the view for BHC 
mergers with securities or real estate development 
firms. For BHC mergers with life insurance firms, how-
ever, the estimated risk of bankruptcy does decline.
1
1 
In our judgement, these results understate the poten-
tial risk resulting from expanded powers for BHCs. 
That is because of the unavoidable bias in our method-
ology. The largest bias, we believe, is that attributable 
to the assumptions of no merger premiums and con-
servative post-merger capitalization of BHC acquisi-
tions. In net, we would expect this bias to quantitatively 
overwhelm all others, and it makes BHC mergers with 
1 'To repeat: all of these results were obtained with both accounting data 
(those in the paper) and market data (those in Appendix A). Some other results, 
however, depend on which data base is used. This is true of the risk effects of 
simulated BHC mergers with property and casualty insurers, insurance 
agents/brokers, and other real estate firms. As discussed in Appendix A, we 
have somewhat more confidence in the accounting measures than in the market 
measures. And the accounting measure results are clear: BHC mergers with all 
firms except life insurance companies increase BHC risk—both the volatility of 
profits and the risk of bankruptcy. 
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nonbank financial firms appear less risky than they 
might actually be. Thus, even the finding of risk-
mitigating effects of BHC-life insurance mergers may 
be suspect. 
We recognize that our assessment of the net effect of 
bias could be challenged. Less subject to challenge, 
however, are our findings regarding the relative effects 
of BHC mergers with firms from the different indus-
tries. Whatever the actual net effect from the various 
sources of bias, there is no reason to believe that it 
should affect the various industry combinations dif-
ferently. And the findings on relative risk effects are, in 
themselves, potentially of great importance for public 
policy. Suppose policymakers are concerned about the 
risk of failure of BHC-affiliated banks and are less-
than-completely confident about corporate separate-
ness as a device to shelter such banks from risk. Then 
they should be aware that the risk implications of BHC-
securities firm mergers, for example, appear to be quite 
different than those of BHC-life insurance mergers. 
And they should be more concerned about the former 
than the latter. 
Appendix A 
Accounting Data vs. Market Data 
Some controversy exists about which type of data provides 
better measures of risk and return: accounting (book) data or 
market (stock price) data. This controversy is not inconsequen-
tial. Our data show that market returns are much more volatile 
than accounting returns for all industries studied. As may be 
seen by comparing Tables 3 and A2, the standard deviations of 
rates of return estimated with market data are roughly from five 
to ten times larger than those estimated with accounting data. 
Similarly, market estimates of Z-scores are from five to ten 
times smaller than accounting estimates. Since all our risk 
measures depend, directly or indirectly, on the volatility of 
profits, this is a potentially important problem for our study. 
Each type of data has advantages and disadvantages. A 
widely recognized problem with accounting data, for example, 
is the intentional smoothing of reported profits. Market returns 
as reflected in stock prices are not intentionally smoothed. But 
regulators let commercial banks, for instance, value assets and 
liabilities at acquisition (historical) costs rather than at market 
values. (That is, they do not mark to market.) 
Market data have their own problems. The volatility of 
market returns, for example, may reflect random noise or at 
least some kind of exogenous shocks which are unrelated to the 
true profitability of the firm. Indeed, no one as yet has 
satisfactorily explained why market returns are consistently as 
volatile as they are (Mehra and Prescott 1985). Market data 
also have a dating problem, which has been called look-ahead 
bias. Market prices have been found to respond to published 
accounting data. The publication date of financial data typically 
lags the end of the reporting period by two or three months. 
Therefore, computing market returns based on stock prices for 
the same date as the end of the accounting period may imply 
that the investor is able to forecast without error. (See, for 
example, Banz and Breen 1986.) 
In sum, neither sort of data appears to be, in theory, 
unambiguously better. We have, therefore, used market data to 
replicate all the tests described in the accompanying paper. 
Since the results are not all the same, we have also done one 
more set of tests, to try to determine which type of data might be 
better for our purposes. The results of these tests seem to favor 
the accounting data. 
Methodology 
The profitability, or rate of return, measure used is R
m: 
(Al) RJ= {P-P^+DjVP^ 
where R
m is the market rate of return on equity, P is price per 
share of common stock, D is cash dividends per share, and j 
13 is, again, the time period. Both P and D are adjusted for stock 
splits and stock dividends. 
The first risk measure, S"\ is the standard deviation of R"
1 
defined as in the paper's equation (2). 
The second risk measure, Z
m, requires that the sample firms' 
balance sheet and income statement items be restated in market 
value terms, using market prices of common stock. 
The market proxy for net income after taxes is n
m: 
(A2) 7f'Jl = R'J'(cj+cj_l)/2 
where c is the number of common shares outstanding, adjusted 




And the market value proxy for total assets is A
m: 
(A4) AJ= E™+ L" 
where L
a is the accounting value of total debt plus preferred 
stock, which we use as an estimate of market value. This is, 
admittedly, a rough approximation because preferred stock is 
included and some of the debt is long term. 
The market-based estimate of z, Z
m, can now be defined: 
(A5) Z
m = ({2-=1[27+ a;,, )]}/n 
+ {fM[(E?+ E?_l)KAf + A]Ll)\}/n)/S
m 
where S
m is the estimated standard deviation of the rate of 
return on assets, InfKA™ + AJ_{). 
A third risk measure is commonly used in the finance 
literature, one which can only be computed with market data. It 
is the beta coefficient of a firm's common stock, a measure of 
the relationship between the rate of return on the stock and the 
average rate of return to the market. Here, beta is obtained by 
estimating the time-series regression 
(A6) R"=a + piRf^ + Uj 
where a is an intercept term; p is an estimate of the beta 
coefficient; RSP is an estimate of the return to the total market, 
which is based on the value of Standard and Poor's 500-stock 




 = (P^-P^)! Pj^ 
and u is an error term. 
Results 
Unmerged Industries 
Market rates of return on equity and risk statistics for the seven 
individual industries during the sample period are shown in 
Tables A1 and A2. The highest median rates of return are 
scored by the securities and real estate development firms at 
28.7 percent and 20.1 percent, respectively. Median returns to 
property and casualty insurance, BHC, other real estate, and life 
insurance firms are all around 15 percent. Returns to insurance 
agents/brokers are lowest at 10.2 percent. The biggest dif-
ference between these results and those from the accounting 
data is the marked drop in the ranking of insurance agents/ 
brokers, from highest to lowest, and the marked rise in the 
returns of both real estate industries. Otherwise, the market and 
accounting return results are generally the same: Returns to 
securities firms are quite high, and BHCs are roughly in the 
middle of the pack. 
The market and accounting risk measures are similar, too, in 
terms of rankings. All three market measures of risk agree with 
the accounting measures that real estate and securities are the 
high-risk industries. BHCs and the insurance industries are 
fairly close, according to all these measures, but with market 
data BHCs are no longer the lowest risk; insurance agents/ 
brokers are. What is most significant about the market risk 
measures, though, is the wide spread between the real estate and 
securities firms at the high end and insurance firms and BHCs at 
the low end. 
Hypothetically Merged Industries 
Shown in Tables A3 and A4 are market return and risk statistics 
for BHCs and for the six hypothetical industries formed by 
merging one BHC with one firm from another industry. Clearly, 
the highest median rates of return belong to the BHC-securities 
combinations; the lowest, to BHC-insurance agents/brokers. 
These results simply reflect the ordering of the unmerged 
industries. 
Both market risk measures, S
m and Z'
n, suggest that the 
highest-risk BHC mergers are those with securities firms and 
real estate development firms. According to both measures, risk 
is higher for those mergers than it is for BHCs alone. The 
lowest-risk BHC mergers are those with insurance agents/ 
brokers, property/casualty insurers, and life insurers. These 
three mergers appear to mitigate BHC risk. 
For the hypothetical industries, the principal risk differences 
between market and accounting data are the results for the 
BHC-property/casualty insurance and BHC-insurance agent/ 
broker mergers. When accounting data are used, these mergers 
increase BHC risk; when market data are used, they decrease it. 
Testing the Bankruptcy Risk Measures 
Since the market and accounting risk measures disagree about 
the effects of some mergers, we devised a method to test which 
of these data types is better at measuring risk. 
Basically, we compare our two sets of Z-scores to the debt 
ratings assigned to the BHCs in our sample. The debt rating 
agencies use accounting data, market returns, and, indeed, all 
publicly available information about firms whose debt they 
evaluate. Moreover, they are primarily interested in the likeli-
hood of failure, which is the kind of risk our Z-scores are 
intended to capture. Thus, debt ratings are arguably a useful 
alternative risk measure against which to test our Z-scores. 
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Tables A1-A4 
Using Market Data to Measure Profitability and Risk in Banking and Other Financial Industries 
Tables A1 and A2 
Historically, 1971-84 
Table A1 Profitability Table A2 Risk 
Industry  Median Rm*  Industry  gm** 
Median 
r t  Pt 
Securities  28.65%  Insurance Agent/Broker  .2458  4.036  .31 
Real Estate Development  20.12  Property/Casualty Insurance  .2499  4.124  .57 
Property/Casualty Insurance  15.79  Bank Holding Company  .2703  3.916  .83 
Bank Holding Company  15.62  Life Insurance  .2924  3.906  .76 
Other Real Estate  15.46  Securities  .5248  1.954  1.69 
Life Insurance  14.64  Other Real Estate  .6430  1.885  1.40 
Insurance Agent/Broker  10.23  Real Estate Development  .6441  1.744  1.77 
Tables A3 and A4 
If a Bank Holding Company Could Have Merged With One Nonbank Financial Firm 
Table A3 Profitability Table A4 Risk 
Median 
lndustry§  Median Rm*  lndustry§  gm**  zmt 
BHC-Securities  21.56%  BHC-lnsurance Agent/Broker  .2029  5.468 
BHC-Real Estate Development  15.82  BHC-Property/Casualty Insurance  .2218  5.137 
BHCs Alone  15.62  BHC—Life Insurance  .2366  4.646 
BHC—Life Insurance  15.30  BHCs Alone  .2703  3.916 
BHC—Other Real Estate  14.82  BHC—Other Real Estate  .2766  3.978 
BHC-Property/Casualty Insurance  14.77  BHC-Real Estate Development  .3006  3.596 
BHC-lnsurance Agent/Broker  12.11  BHC-Securities  .3636  3.279 
'Market rate of return on equity 
"Standard deviation of market return on equity 
tMeasure of bankruptcy risk 
{Beta coefficient of a firm's common stock 
§Each hypothetical industry includes 100 firms created by merging 2 randomly selected firms from our 1971-84 sample of publicly traded financial firms. 
Source: Standard and Poor's Compustat Services, Inc. 
We obtained Moody's commercial paper ratings for all 
BHCs in the sample that were rated at the end of 1984, the last 
year of our time series. There were 71 altogether, 48 with paper 
rated PI—the highest rating—and 23 with paper rated P2 and 
lower. We then did two simple tests. The first was a two-way 
analysis of variance of Z-scores against the commercial paper 
ratings. With accounting data, the mean Z-scores were 60.8 for 
PI firms and 44.5 for P2 firms. According to the standard 
F-test, these means were significantly different at the 95 percent 
confidence level. With the market data, the comparable mean 
Z-scores were 4.2 and 4.0, respectively, with only about 44 
percent confidence that the true means were different. 
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Market Measure of Capitalization 
of Bank Holding Companies 
and Other Financial Firms in 1971-84 
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Bank Holding Company  5.00% 
Life Insurance  17.97 
Securities  22.42 
Property/Casualty Insurance  27.19 
Real Estate Development  29.17 
Other Real Estate  30.22 
Insurance Agent/Broker  49.86 
Source: Standard and Poor's Compustat Services, Inc. 
Next, we used the two sets of Z-scores to classify BHCs into 
low-risk and high-risk groups and compared the results to 
groups based on the commercial paper ratings. Only outlying 
BHCs, those with Z-scores more than one standard deviation 
from the mean, were used in this procedure. The accounting 
Z-scores correctly classified more than 88 percent of the firms 
(15 out of 17), whereas the market Z-scores correctly classified 
only 47 percent (7 out of 15). 
In sum, the accounting Z-scores appear to convey much 
of the information that is in commercial paper ratings, while 
the market Z-scores do not. To the extent, therefore, that 
commercial paper ratings are useful measures of bankruptcy 
risk, Z-scores computed with accounting data are better than 
those computed with market data. 
Proponents of expanded BHC powers might argue that the 
prospects for risk reduction increase with the number of new 
industries that BHCs are allowed to enter. Our limited exami-
nation of this issue suggests that they might be wrong. 
The possible combinations of BHCs with other industries 
are far too many to analyze using our methodology. With seven 
sample industries, there are 63 possible combinations of BHCs 
and one or more other industries. Our simulations require many 
computations, and examining all possible combinations would 
simply cost too much. Moreover, examining all possible 
combinations could produce what appeared to be a good 
combination merely by chance. 
Instead, we examine three-industry mergers involving 
combinations of a BHC, a securities firm, and a firm from one of 
the five other industries. We selected these combinations 
because much of the recently proposed legislation specifically 
involves opening up the securities industry to BHCs. The idea 
was to see if, by adding a third industry, the undesirable risk 
effects of BHC-securities mergers (discovered in the accom-
panying paper) could be reversed. 
The answer, apparently, is no. Tables B1-B3 show the 
results of these simulated three-firm mergers, based on account-
ing data. Not surprisingly (considering the relatively high 
profitability of the securities industry), all the new industries' 
profitability measures are higher than that measure for BHCs 
alone. But all the three-firm risk measures also turn out to be 
higher than those for BHCs alone. 
16 John H. Boyd, Stanley L. Graham 
Bank Holding Company Diversification 
Tables B1 and B2 
Measuring Profitability and Risk If a Bank Holding Company 
Could Have Merged With a Securities Firm 
and One Other Nonbank Financial Firm 
Table B1 Profitability Table B2 Risk 
lndustry§  Median R*  lndustry§  S** 
Median 
zt 
BHC—Securities- BHCs Alone  .0245  43.36 
Insurance Agent/Broker  17.45%  BHC—Securities-
Property/Casualty Insurance  14.53  Life Insurance  .0311  34.26 
Real Estate Development  14.19  Property/Casualty Insurance  .0397  27.01 
Life Insurance  14.02  Insurance Agent/Broker  .0453  23.17 
Other Real Estate  13.38  Other Real Estate  .0508  23.53 
BHCs Alone  13.12  Real Estate Development  .0516  20.79 
*Rate of return on equity 
"Standard deviation of return on equity 
tMeasure of bankruptcy risk 
§Each hypothetical industry includes 100 firms created by merging 3 randomly selected firms from our 1971-84 sample of publicly traded financial firms. 
Source: Standard and Poor's Compustat Services, Inc. 
Table B3 
Bank Holding Companies' Share of Assets 
in Simulated Three-Firm Mergers 
Median 
Hypothetical Industry* BHC Share 
BHC—Securities— 
Other Real Estate  74% 
Insurance Agent/Broker  68 
Real Estate Development  61 
Life Insurance  51 
Property/Casualty Insurance  40 
"Each hypothetical industry includes 100 firms created by merging 3 randomly selected firms 
from our 1971-84 sample of publicly traded financial firms. 
Source: Standard and Poor's Compustat Services, Inc. 
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Sample Firms 
Bank Holding Companies (146) 
Affiliated Bankshares of Colorado, Inc. 
Allied Bancshares, Inc. 
American Fletcher Corporation 
American Security Corporation 
Ameritrust Corporation 
Amsouth Bancorporation 
Arizona Bancwest Corporation 
Atlantic Bancorporation 
Banc One Corporation 
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico 
BancOklahoma Corp. 
Bancorp Hawaii, Inc. 
BancTEXAS Group Inc. 
Bank of Boston Corp. 
Bank of New England Corporation 
Bank of New York Company, Inc. 
Bank of Virginia Company 
BankAmerica Corporation 
Bankers Trust New York Corporation 
Banks of Iowa, Inc. 
Banks of Mid-America Inc. 
Barnett Banks of Florida, Inc. 
BayBanks, Inc. 
Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc. 
Centerre Bancorporation 
Central Bancorporation, Inc. 
Central Bancshares of the South, Inc. 
Central Fidelity Banks, Inc. 
Centran Corp. 
The Chase Manhattan Corporation 
Chemical New York Corporation 
Citicorp 
Citizens and Southern Georgia Corporation 
Citizens Fidelity Corporation 
Citizens First Bancorp, Inc. 
Colorado National Bankshares, Inc. 
Comerica Incorporated 
Commerce Bancshares, Inc. 
Commerce Union Corporation 
Continental Bancorp, Inc. 
Continental Illinois Corporation 
CoreStates Financial Corp 
Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc. 
Deposit Guaranty Corp. 





First Alabama Bancshares, Inc. 
First American Corp. 
First Atlanta Corporation 
First Bank System, Inc. 
First Bankers Corp. of Florida 
First Chicago Corporation 
First City Bancorporation of Texas, Inc. 
First Empire State Corporation 
First Fidelity Bancorporation 
First Florida Banks, Inc. 
First Hawaiian, Inc. 
First Interstate Bancorp. 
First Kentucky National Corporation 
First Maryland Bancorp 
First National Cincinnati Corp. 
First of America Bank Corporation 
First Oklahoma Bancorporation, Inc. 
First Pennsylvania Corporation 
First Security Corporation 
First Tennessee National Corporation 
First Union Corporation 
First Virginia Banks, Inc. 
First Wisconsin Corporation 
First Wyoming Bancorp. 
Fleet Financial Group, Inc. 
Florida National Banks of Florida, Inc. 
General Bancshares Corp. 
Hartford National Corp. 
Horizon Bancorp 
Huntington Bancshares, Incorporated 
Indiana National Corporation 
Interfirst Corporation 
Intrawest Financial Corp. 
Irving Bank Corporation 
IVB Financial Corp. 
J. P. Morgan and Co. Incorporated 
Key Banks Inc. 
Landmark Bancshares Corp. 
Manufacturers Hanover Corporation 
Manufacturers National Corporation 
Marine Corp. 
Marine Midland Banks, Inc. 
Marshall & Ilsley Corp. 
Maryland National Corporation 
MCorp 
Mellon Bank Corp. 
Mercantile Bancorporation, Inc. 
Meridian Bancorp, Inc. 
Michigan National Corp. 
Midlantic Banks Inc. 
Money Management Corp. 
Moore Financial Group Inc. 
National Bancshares Corp. of Texas 
National City Corporation 
NBD Bancorp, Inc. 
NCNB Corporation 
Norstar Bancorp Inc. 
Northern Trust Corporation 
Northwestern Financial Corp. 
Norwest Corporation 
Old Kent Financial Corp. 
Old Stone Corp. 
Pan American Banks, Inc. 
PNC Financial Corp 
Rainier Bancorporation 
Republic New York Corporation 
Republicbank Corporation 
Riggs National Corporation 
RIHT Financial Corporation 
Security Pacific Corporation 
Shawmut Corp. 
Society Corporation 
South Carolina National Corp. 
Southeast Banking Corporation 
Southtrust Corporation 
Sovran Financial Corporation 
State Street Boston Corp. 
Sterling Bancorp New York 
Suburban Bancorp 
Suntrust Banks, Inc. 
Sunwest Financial Services, Inc. 
Texas American Bancshares, Inc. 
Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc. 
Third National Corp. 
Union Natl. Corp. (PA) 
Union Planters Corp. 
United Banks of Colorado, Inc. 
United Jersey Banks 
United Missouri Bancshares, Inc. 
United Virginia Bankshares, Incorporated 
U.S. Bancorp 
U.S. Trust Corporation 
Valley National Corporation 
The Wachovia Corporation 
Wells Fargo & Company 
Worthen Banking Corp. 
Zions Utah Bancorporation 
18 John H. Boyd, Stanley L. Graham 
Bank Holding Company Diversification 
Life Insurance Firms (30) 
Aetna Life & Casualty Co. 
American Family Corporation 
American General Corporation 
American Heritage Life Invest Corp. 
American National Insurance Co. 
Business Men's Assurance Co. of America 
Capital Holding Corporation 
Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co. 
Colonial Penn Group, Inc. 
Combined International Corp. 
I.C.H. Corp. 
Independent Insurance Group, Inc. 
Jefferson-Pilot Corporation 
Kansas City Life Insurance Co. 
Lamar Life Corp. 
Laurentian Capital Corp. 
Liberty Corp. 
Lincoln National Corporation 
Manhattan National Corp. 
Monarch Capital Corp. 
Monumental Corporation 
Northwestern National Life Insurance Co. 
Protective Life Corp. 
Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co. 
Torchmark Corporation 
The Travelers Corporation 
United Companies Financial Corp. 
Uslico Corp. 
USLIFE Corporation 
Washington National Corporation 
Property/Casualty Insurance Firms (15) 
American International Group, Inc. 




CNA Financial Corp. 
Continental Corp. 
Geico Corp. 
General Re Corp. 
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection 
and Insurance Co. 
Mission Insurance Group, Inc. 
Orion Capital Corp. 
SAFECO Corporation 
The St. Paul Companies, Inc. 
USF&G Corporation 
Insurance Agent/Broker Firms (5) 
Alexander & Alexander Services, Inc. 
Corroon and Black Corp. 
Equifax Inc. 
Hall (Frank B.) & Co., Inc. 
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 
Real Estate Development Firms (31) 
AMREP Corp. 
Calprop Corporation 
Campanelli Industries, Inc. 
Centennial Group Inc. 
Christiana Companies, Inc. 
Deltona Corp. 
Development Corp. of America 
Fairfield Communities, Inc. 
First City Industries Inc. 
FPA Corp. 
Gulfstream Land & Development Corp. 
ITI Corp. 
Kaufman & Broad, Inc. 
Key Co. 
Killearn Properties, Inc. 
Koger Properties, Inc. 




Nelson (L.B.) Corp. 
Newhall Land & Farming Co. 
Oriole Homes Corp. 
Pulte Home Corp. 
Punta Gorda Isles, Inc. 
Radice Corp. 
Royal Palm Beach Colony, 
Limited Partnership 
Seligman & Associates, Inc. 
Standard-Pacific Corp. 
Starrett Housing Corp. 
U.S. Home Corp. 
Other Real Estate Firms (11) 
Angeles Corporation 
Arlen Realty & Development Corp. 
Bay Financial Corp. 
British Land of America 
Grubb & Ellis Company 
Horizon Corp. 
New Mexico & Arizona Land Co. 
PHH Group Inc. 
Southmark Corp. 
Weingarten Realty, Inc. 
Wheeling and Lake Erie Realty Co. 
Securities Firms (11) 
Diversified Industries, Inc. 
Dreyfus Corporation 
Edwards (A.G.), Inc. 
Fidata Corp. 
First Boston, Inc. 
Hutton (E.F.) Group Inc. 
Integrated Resources, Inc. 
Inter-Regional Financial Group, Inc. 
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 
Paine Webber Inc. 
Phibro Salomon Corporation 
Source: Standard and Poor's Compustat Services, Inc. 
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